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The Silent Child: A Quantitative Analysis of
Children’s Evidence in Canadian Custody and
Access Cases
Noel Semple*
There are two possible forms of evidence in a custody or access (visitation)
case which is determined through adjudication. First, the judge may hear from the
adult parties and the witnesses whom they choose to call. Second, the judge may
hear “children’s evidence,” which comes either directly from the child, or from a
neutral professional with child-related expertise. To determine the prevalence of
children’s evidence in Canadian custody and access litigation, the author con-
ducted a quantitative survey of 181 reported decisions from 2009. The central find-
ing was that only 45% mentioned any form of children’s evidence. Among the vari-
ous varieties of children’s evidence, assessments (also known as child custody
evaluations) were much more common than legal representation of children or di-
rect evidence from children. The article concludes by contrasting the primacy of
the child in custody and access doctrine with the reality that the children involved
appear to be effectively silent in the majority of the adjudicated cases.
1. INTRODUCTION
Canadian judges must decide custody and access disputes through exclusive
reference to the best interests of the child involved. So says the law.1 However, the
procedure by which the judge receives information and argument before making
the decision is not characterized by an exclusive focus on the child. Adults, not
children, have the right to commence custody and access litigation. Adults, not
children, choose if and when to terminate it through settlement. The present article
focuses on the evidence available to the judge in a private custody or access dis-
pute. Is the evidence also controlled by the adult litigants, or is it children’s evi-
dence? Children’s evidence (which will be defined more comprehensively below)
has the distinguishing feature of coming not from one of the adult litigants, but
rather from the child or from a professional with child-related expertise.
This inquiry is made especially pertinent by the law’s stated intention to put
children’s interests first when parenting arrangements are in dispute. If the interests
of the adult litigants are indeed legally irrelevant (as the law provides), it would be
odd to find adults controlling most of the information which comes before the deci-
* Ph.D Candidate, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am grateful to
Professor Bryn Greer-Wootten of the Institute for Social Research (York University)
for his assistance with the statistical tests used in this article.
1 Divorce Act, R.S.C. 1985, (2d Supp.), c. 3, at 4-5 s. 16(8), and provisions to the same
effect in all provincial and territorial family law statutes. The Supreme Court of Canada
has affirmed this principle in and Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 CarswellBC 1999,
2001 CarswellBC 2000, 2001 SCC 60, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014 (S.C.C.).
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sion-maker. If the children’s interests are the only important interests, then one
might expect judges to be hearing comprehensive and neutral information about
what those interests require. However, it would be incongruous if the methods by
which this information is gathered are themselves potentially dangerous to the chil-
dren involved.
To explore these issues, the author undertook a quantitative review of all 181
substantive custody and access decisions which were reported in Canada’s two
commercial electronic case law databases during a five month period in 2009.2 The
objectives of this analysis were (i) to learn how many of the cases involved any
form of direct evidence from the child or professional child-focused evidence, and
(ii) to identify the relative prevalence of the various possible forms of children’s
evidence.
There were two central findings. First, only 45% of the judgments in the sam-
ple mentioned any children’s evidence. In the remainder, the only evidence men-
tioned was the testimony of the adult parties or other evidence which was called
and arranged by them. Second, when children’s evidence is present, it is most
likely to come in the form of an assessment prepared by a psychologist or social
worker (30% of the cases). Direct evidence from children and legal representation
of children were very rare. These two forms of children’s evidence were referred to
in only 3% and 7% of the 181 judgments, respectively. Several interesting varia-
tions in the prevalence of children’s evidences in cases of different types and from
different jurisdictions will also be discussed below.
2. CHILDREN’S EVIDENCE DEFINED
Children’s evidence in a custody and access case is evidence which is not al-
igned with either of the competing adult litigants. It can be classified in terms of its
content and in terms of its source. In terms of content, this evidence may be about
the child’s views and preferences regarding parenting. It can also consist of other
information relevant to his or her interests. Very often, it includes both types of
content.
There are three possible sources of children’s evidence. First is direct chil-
dren’s evidence which passes unmediated from the child to the judge. An affidavit
or written communication from a child intended for the judge would be direct chil-
dren’s evidence. A judicial interview of or courtroom testimony from a child are
also in this category.
Second, children’s evidence includes child-focused evidence, which comes
from a professional with child expertise and a mandate to identify the best interests
and/or preferences of the child. Child-focused evidence includes assessments or
evaluations of the child’s best interests or preferences conducted by social workers,
psychologists, or psychiatrists. It also includes representations made by a lawyer
for the child. Defining children’s “evidence” to include a lawyer’s submissions
constitutes an unusually broad use of the term. However, such submissions are fun-
damentally of a kind with other types of children’s evidence insofar as they are
2 Child protection proceedings are not part of the subject matter of this article. The meth-
odology is explained in greater detail below, at p. 10.
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offer information to the custody or access decision-maker which is independent of
the adult parties.
Third is derivative children’s evidence. This includes information from child
protection service employees, counsellors for children, and medical professionals
who worked personally with the child. Individuals in this final group are not man-
dated to produce evidence for a custody or access dispute, but obtain such evidence
incidentally while discharging other functions.3 Although they generally become
witnesses in custody and access disputes after being called by one of the adult par-
ties, they offer professional expertise. It is presumed that what they say reflects
their professional opinions as opposed to a desire to help the adult parties who
called them.
The diagram below illustrates the different types of children’s evidence ac-
cording to the “content” and “source” descriptors.
Children’s Evidence: Content and Source
Content → Child’s own views and Professional opinions
preferences about child’s best
interests
Source↓
Direct Evidence from [always] [not applicable]
Child
Child-Focused Evidence [usually contains both types of content, in varying
proportions]
Derivative Children’s [may contain both types of content, but often con-
Evidence tains only one or the other]
3. ADMISSIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S EVIDENCE IN CUSTODY
AND ACCESS CASES
Children are almost never parties in custody and access litigation which con-
cerns them.4 The admissibility of their evidence in these proceedings is therefore a
live issue. In Gordon v. Goertz, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that “where
the child is old and mature enough, his or her wishes and preferences” are among
the factors a judge must consider before making a custody order.5 The applicable
statutes generally use permissive language empowering judges to decide whether or
3 The literature does not generally group lawyers for children together with other profes-
sionals. However the researcher chose to do so because both are child-focused sources
of information for the decision-maker. This distinguishes their evidence from both (i)
that which adults choose to put forward, and (ii) that which comes directly from the
child.
4 None of the 181 cases in the sample analyzed for this article included children as
parties.
5 Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CarswellSask 199, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, 19 R.F.L. (4th) 177,
1996 CarswellSask 199F (S.C.C.).
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not children’s evidence should be admitted on a case-by-case basis.6 In no part of
Canada does a child of any age have an inalienable right to present direct or child-
focused evidence in a custody or access dispute. However, many judges are reluc-
tant to refuse admission of any evidence which appears relevant to the child’s best
interest,7 and some scholars have argued that the rules of evidence should be more
liberally applied in this context.8
In exercising its discretion to admit or refuse direct children’s evidence, a
court will generally balance its probative value against its potential a) to do harm to
the child, and/or b) to prejudice the interests of the adult parties. Child-focused
evidence from a professional is less likely to harm the child. However, it can give
rise to its own issues about the neutrality of the professional and the procedure
which he or she used.9 Judicial opinion is mixed about whether a lawyer represent-
ing a child can directly state the child’s views and preferences, or whether this
constitutes an impermissible confusion of the roles of advocate and witness.10
Admitting derivative children’s evidence does not mean subjecting the child to
a new and potentially damaging investigation, insofar as this evidence has by defi-
nition already been obtained in another context. However, it can give rise to ques-
tions about whether the confidentiality owed to the child by the potential witness
would be violated if it were to be used in the litigation. The law pertaining to the
privilege for confidentiality seeks to balance these concerns.11
6 E.g. British Columbia’s Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128 states at s.
24(1)(b) that the court “must consider . . . if appropriate, the views of the child.” [em-
phasis added] Quebec’s Civil Code states at art. 34: “The court shall, in every applica-
tion brought before it affecting the interest of a child, give the child an opportunity to
be heard if his age and power of discernment permit it.” According to Rachel Birn-
baum & Nicholas Bala, “The Child’s Perspective On Representation: Young Adults
Report On Their Experiences With Child Lawyers” (2009) 25 Can. J. Fam. L. 11, in
five provinces judicial interviews are explicitly allowed by statute and in the others
case law has found this procedure to be within the powers of the court.
7 Redshaw v. Redshaw (1985), 1985 CarswellSask 102, 47 R.F.L. (2d) 104 (Sask. C.A.)
at para. 4 [R.F.L.]; Gordon v. Gordon (1980), 23 R.F.L. (2d) 266, 1980 CarswellOnt
341 (Ont. C.A.) at para. 11 [CarswellOnt]; F. (J.K.) v. F. (J.D.) (1988), 1988 Car-
swellBC 885, [1988] W.D.F.L. 799 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 17 [W.D.F.L.].
8 Rollie Thompson identifies this point of view without endorsing it in D. A. Rollie
Thompson, “Are There Any Rules of Evidence in Family Law?” (2003) 21 Can. Fam.
L.Q. 245 at section 2(c)(ii). Nicholas Bala and Annelise Saunders argue the position in
“Understanding the Family Context: Why the Law of Expert Evidence is Different in
Family Law Cases” (2002) 20 Can. Fam. L.Q. 277.
9 James G. McLeod, Child Custody Law and Practice (Scarborough, Ont.: Carswell,
1992) at section 1(4)(a). See also Thompson, ibid. and Bala & Saunders, ibid.
10 E.g., in Ontario, compare Strobridge v. Strobridge, 1994 CarswellOnt 400, 4 R.F.L.
(4th) 169, 18 O.R. (3d) 753, 115 D.L.R. (4th) 489, 72 O.A.C. 379 (Ont. C.A.) and
Zamanchuk v. Baldwin, 2000 CarswellOnt 1249. See also Dan Goldberg, “Represent-
ing Children in Custody & Access Proceedings” (The Voice of the Child, March 5
2009) [unpublished].
11 Thompson, at 271–3; D. A. Rollie Thompson, “Five Vexing and Vexatious Issues in
Family Law Evidence and Procedure” in Martha Shaffer ed., Contemporary Issues in
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In Canadian jurisdictions in which there is a state-funded provider of child-
focused evidence,12 the state agency generally retains some discretion about how,
when, and if children’s evidence will be provided. For example, if a judge requests
that Ontario’s Office of the Children’s Lawyer (OCL) provide legal representation
for a child or an assessment of a child, the OCL itself decides whether and how to
become involved.13 In British Columbia, by contrast, Family Justice Counsellors
employed by the B.C. Ministry of the Attorney General cannot refuse to become
involved.14 The B.C. Family Relations Act states that “the court may . . . direct an
investigation” and that anyone who does so “must report the results of the investi-
gation in the manner that the court directs.”15 However, the judge cannot order that
the report be completed within a specific time frame, and long delays result be-
cause demand exceeds supply.16 The agency retains discretion over when to pro-
vide services.
4. CHILDREN’S EVIDENCE: THEORY AND DEBATES
Commentators are generally enthusiastic about children’s evidence in custody
and access disputes. Many who focus on vindicating children’s rights in legal dis-
putes argue that a child should be entitled to a role or a voice in a procedure which
touches him or her so closely.17 Those in this group often cite the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, Article 12 of which states:
1. States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or
her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters affect-
ing the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance
with the age and maturity of the child.
Family Law: Engaging with the Legacy of James G. McLeod (Toronto Thomson-Cars-
well, 2007) at 3.
12 According to Birnbaum & Bala, above note 6 at their note 15, “New Brunswick is the
only province that does not provide any public funding for child custody assessments.”
13 Ontario’s Courts of Justice Act s. 89(3.1) states that “at the request of a court, the
Children’s Lawyer may act as the legal representative of a minor,” and s. 112.(1) states
that it “may cause an investigation to be made and may report and make recommenda-
tions to the court.” [emphasis added]
14 Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services Branch — Civil and
Family Law Policy Office, Family Relations Act Review Discussion Paper Chapter 8:
Children’s Participation, 2007) at 9.
15 British Columbia Family Relations Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 128, at ss. 15(1) and 15(2).
Emphasis added.
16 Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services Branch — Civil and
Family Law Policy Office, above note 14.
17 Jodi Rebecca Fleishman, Mandatory legal representation for children in custody, ac-
cess and child protection proceedings, (LL.M, McGill University (Canada), 2006) [un-
published]; Ronda Bessner, The Voice of the Child in Divorce, Custody and Access
Proceedings. Department of Justice, Canada, 2002-FCY-1E (Ottawa, 2002) Online:
dsp-psd.communication.gc.ca/Collection/J3-1-2002-1E.pdf at 2, citing C. Bernard, R.
Ward, and B. Knoppers, “Best Interests of the Child Exposed: A Portrait of Quebec
Custody and Protection Law” (1992-93), 11 Can. J. Fam. L. 57 at 136.
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2. For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportu-
nity to be heard in any judicial and administrative proceedings affecting
the child, either directly, or through a representative or an appropriate
body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of national law.18
This rights-based perspective, which author Ronda Bessner identifies as the
“child liberationist or self-determination model,” may be becoming more
prevalent.19
However, the more common argument for children’s evidence in custody and
access disputes is that including it is in the best interests of the child. This position
is consonant with a “child protectionist” model wherein the law focuses on chil-
dren’s interests rather than their rights.20 The argument from best interests for chil-
dren’s evidence has two versions. First, it is said that a judge with access to chil-
dren’s evidence is more likely to reach a conclusion which will be in the child’s
best interests.21 Secondly, it is argued that participation in the process has salutary
psychological effects for the child regardless of outcome, while conversely being
excluded can have negative effects.22 After a comprehensive review of Canadian
and international empirical evidence, Bala and Birnbaum recently concluded that
“children want and need to be heard during times of parental separation and di-
vorce. . . . they want their stories to be heard.”23
Some authors are more sceptical about children’s evidence. A few have
claimed that it is simply not necessary in order to do justice in custody or access
disputes,24 or that it is incompatible with our adversary civil justice system.25 How-
ever the more common argument acknowledges the potential benefits but claims
18 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 12.
19 Bessner, above note 17 at 8; Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice
Services Branch — Civil and Family Law Policy Office, above note 14 at 2; Maria
Coley, “Children’s Voices in Access and Custody Decisions: The Need to Reconceptu-
alize Rights and Effect Transformative Change” (2007) 12 Appeal, A Review of Cur-
rent Law and Law Reform 48 at para 86.
20 Bessner, above note 17 at 9 and Fiona Kelly, “Conceptualising the child through an
‘ethic of care’: lessons for family law” (2005) 1 International Journal of Law in Con-
text 375.
21 Coley, above note 19 at para 42; Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Ac-
cess, For the Sake of the Children. Senate and House of Commons, (Ottawa, 1998)
Online: http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?COM=147&Lang
=1&SourceId=36230 in Chapter 2, Section B; Bessner, above note 17 at 32-33; Coley,
above note 19 at 53.
22 Coley, above note 19 at pp. 54 and 56; Dale Hensley, “Role and Responsibilities of
Counsel for the Child in Alberta: A Response to Professor Bala” (2006) 43 Alta. L.
Rev. 871 at 880; Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services
Branch — Civil and Family Law Policy Office, above note 14 at 3 and, regarding the
possible salutary effects of judicial interviews, at 13.
23 Birnbaum & Bala, above note 6 at 40.
24 This position is cited but not endorsed by Bessner, above note 17 at 1. See also Birn-
baum & Bala, above note 6 at 14-15.
25 Bessner, at 56, regarding judicial interviews.
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that these are outweighed by the costs or risks to the child.26 The most obvious
dangers arise from children being asked to choose between their parents.27 Being
confronted with this question can be traumatic for the child and undermine the
child’s relationship with one or both of the parents.28 Scholarly opposition is most
common with regard to direct children’s evidence such as the judicial interview or
testimony in court.29 Dale Hensley and Rachel Birnbaum are among those who
suggest that the ideal form of children’s evidence will come from a lawyer/social
worker team.30
Among those who agree that children’s evidence should have a place in cus-
tody and access litigation, normative debates persist about the “when” and the
“how.”31 When a lawyer represents a child in a custody or access dispute, what role
should that lawyer play?32 There is a discussion in the literature about what role the
child’s parents should play in choosing or paying for that lawyer.33 With regard to
the conduct of the lawyer once retained, the key alternatives seem to be (i) repre-
senting the child’s views and preferences, or (ii) advocating a position which the
lawyer feels to be in the child’s best interests.34 Counsel from Ontario’s Office of
the Children’s Lawyer generally communicates the child’s views and preferences if
the child is capable of expressing them, without necessarily arguing that the court
26 Ibid., at 1, and Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services
Branch — Civil and Family Law Policy Office, above note 14 at 3.
27 Nicholas Bala, “Child Representation in Alberta: Role and Responsibilities of Counsel
for the Child in Family Proceedings” (2006) 43 Alta. L. Rev. 845 at 863, citing Richard
A. Warshak, “Payoffs and Pitfalls of Listening to Children” (2003) 52 Family Rela-
tions 373; Robert E. Emery, “Children’s Voices: Listening — and Deciding — is an
Adult Responsibility — 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 621 2003” (2003).
28 Bala, “Child Representation in Alberta,” above note 27 at 863.
29 Bessner, above note 17 at 56; Bala, “Child Representation in Alberta,” above note 27;
Special Joint Committee on Child Custody and Access, above note 21 in Chapter 2,
Section B. However, Justice George Czutrin of the Superior Court of Justice in Ontario
is among those who believe that judicial interview can be useful in certain cases
(George Czutrin, “Remarks” (Family Law: The Voice of the Child (Remarks delivered
at Law Society of Upper Canada Continuing Legal Education seminar, March 5th
2009.) [unpublished]).
30 Hensley, above note 22 at 882; Rachel Birnbaum & Dena Moyal, “How Social Work-
ers and Lawyers Collaborate” (2003) 21 Can. Fam. L.Q. 379.
31 Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services Branch — Civil and
Family Law Policy Office, above note 14 at 3.
32 Bessner, above note 17 at 15; Hensley, above note 22 at 878.
33 Christine D. Davies, “Access to Justice for Children: The Voice of the Child in Cus-
tody and Access Disputes” (2004) 22 Can. Fam. L.Q. 153 at FN68; Bessner, above
note 17 at 15 and 30-31.
34 Several authors identify a third role — that of amicus curiae (“friend of the court.”)
E.g. Davies, above note 33; Bessner, at 20; Hensley, at 876; Goldberg, [unpublished] at
2b-5, and Bala, “Child Representation in Alberta,” above note 27. See Hensley, above
note 22 at 876 et seq.: differences between the 3 roles.
8   CANADIAN FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY [29 C.F.L.Q.]
should give them effect.35 Alberta lawyer Dale Hensley argues that lawyers should
generally take instructions from child clients instead of substituting their own
views.36
In their recent article dealing with older children, Bala and Birnbaum gener-
ally endorse this position.37 However, their interviews with children and a review
of the empirical literature lead them to other equally important conclusions about
how lawyers should approach the representation of children in custody and access
disputes. They argue that making time to listen to and communicate with the child
is of central importance, and that more interdisciplinary training is necessary to
equip lawyers for this role.38
For Nicholas Bala and a number of others, the nature of the lawyer’s role
depends on the nature of the child.39 This leads to a second question. What charac-
teristics of the child client are determinative when the lawyer is deciding whether to
advocate the child’s preferences or the child’s interests as the lawyer perceives
them?40 In other words, which children have “capacity to instruct counsel?”41
Some would make rebuttable presumptions about a child’s capacity based on the
child’s age,42 while others such as Andrew Kaufman would leave this to the discre-
tion of counsel.43
Custody and access assessments generate their own share of debates. Psycho-
logical tests are commonly deployed when psychiatrists or psychologists conduct
assessments,44 but there is substantial scepticism in some quarters about their util-
35 Birnbaum & Moyal, “How social workers and lawyers collaborate” above note 30;
Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario) — Office of the Children’s Lawyer, in Pol-
icy Statement: Role Of Child’s Counsel (April 1, 2006 (revised)) 2006) at p. 3.
36 Hensley, above note 22 at 879 and 884-5. However, Hensley also states at 882 that it is
“inappropriate to appoint counsel . . . for a child just to find out what a young person
thinks about the issues about which the judge must decide.” See also Jeffery Wilson,
Priscilla Darrell & Mary Tomlinson, Wilson on Children and the Law, 2nd (looseleaf)
ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1986) at §6.24.
37 Birnbaum & Bala, “The Child’s Perspective On Representation: Young Adults Report
On Their Experiences With Child Lawyers” above note 6 at 68.
38 Ibid. at 66.
39 Bala, “Child Representation in Alberta,” above note 27 at 41.
40 Bessner, above note 17 at 26; Quebec Bar Committee, “The Legal Representation of
Children: A Consultation Paper prepared by the Quebec Bar Committee” (1996) 13
Can. J. Fam. L. 60 at 110–120.
41 Hensley, at 889 et seq.; Bala, “Child Representation in Alberta,” above note 27 at 37
and 42–44.
42 Davies, above note 33 at FN22; Quebec Bar Committee, at 107-8; Birnbaum & Bala,
“The Child’s Perspective On Representation: Young Adults Report On Their Exper-
iences With Child Lawyers.”
43 Hensley, above note 22 at 892; Andrew L. Kaufman, “Representing a Minor: A Shared
Dilemma in Ontario and Massachusetts” (2008) 46 O.H.L.J. 159 at 171-2.
44 Bow and Quinnell, in their 2002 survey of assessments by psychologists, found that
90% conducted psychological tests on the parents and 38% conducted them on the
child(ren). (James N. Bow & Francella A. Quinnell, “A Critical Review of Child Cus-
tody Evaluation Reports” (2002) 40 Fam. Ct. Rev. 164 at 168). See also Barbara J.
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ity.45 While some say that more time should be taken in conducting assessments,46
Rachel Birnbaum and her colleagues have suggested that shorter and more focused
assessments can produce the same benefits at lower costs.47 A number of scholars
accept the value of custody and access assessment reports, but insist that they
should not include “ultimate issue” recommendations about what the judge should
order.48
5. QUANTIFYING CHILDREN’S EVIDENCE
How prevalent are the various forms of children’s evidence in reported Cana-
dian custody and access decisions? The literature contains many general observa-
tions on this point. However, little quantitative data is available.
Maria Coley claims that “children . . . are, for the most part, rendered invisible
and voiceless in legal proceedings,” including custody and access.49 Nicholas Bala
reported in 2006 that “there has been an increase in the number of family law cases
in Alberta where counsel is appointed to represent a child,” although child protec-
tion proceedings were included in the family cases to which he was referring. With
regard to the relative prevalence of the various forms of children’s evidence, Chris-
tine Davies wrote that the three most common are judicial interviews, independent
expert reports, and lawyers representing children.50 B.C.’s Ministry of the Attorney
General suggests that expert reports are the most common mechanism by which
Fidler & Rachel Birnbaum, “Child Custody Disputes: Private and Public Assessments”
(2006) 25 Can. Fam. L.Q. 137.
45 Fidler & Birnbaum, ibid.; Daniel W. Shuman, “The Role of Mental Health Experts in
Custody Decisions: Science, Psychological Tests, and Clinical Judgment” (2002) 36
Fam. L.Q. 135; Timothy M. Tippins & Jeffrey P. Wittmann, “Empirical and Ethical
Problems with Custody Recommendations” (2005) 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 193; Rachel Birn-
baum, Barbara Jo Fidler & Katherine Kavassalis, Child custody assessments: a re-
source guide for legal and mental health professionals (Toronto: Thomson Carswell,
2008) at 62.
46 E.g. Mary Kay Kisthardt & Barbara Glesner Fines, “Making a Place at the Table”
(2005) 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 229 call for groups of experts to give opinions in custody and
access cases.
47 Rachel Birnbaum & Helen Radovanovic, “Brief intervention model for access-based
postseparation disputes: Family and court outcomes” (1999) 37 Fam. & Con-
cil.Cts.Rev. 504; Rachel Birnbaum, Reaching beyond the past/focusing on the future:
An empirical examination of two different approaches to access-based disputes, (Ph D,
University of Toronto (Canada), 2001) [unpublished]; Rachel Birnbaum & Willson
McTavish, Post-Separation Visitation Disputes: Differential Interventions (Back-
ground Paper 2001-FCY-6). Department of Justice Canada, 2001) Online:
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/pad-rpad/rep-rap/2001_6/toc-tdm.html; Rachel Birn-
baum & Dena Moyal, “Visitation Based Disputes Arising on Separation and Divorce:
Focused Child Legal Representation” (2002) 20 Can. Fam. L.Q. 37.
48 E.g. Jonathan W. Gould & David A. Martindale, “A Second Call for Clinical Humility
and Judicial Vigilance” (2005) 43 Fam. Ct. Rev. 253; Tippins & Wittmann, above note
45.
49 Coley, above note 19 at 52.
50 Davies, above note 33.
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children’s voices are heard in family disputes in that province.51 Child Custody
Law and Practice appears to concur, stating “the law has now reached a point
across the country where expert evidence is a common component of most con-
tested custody and access cases.”52 A number of scholars have observed that direct
evidence from children is rarely present in custody and access disputes, either in
the form of judicial interview or open testimony of the child.53
Rene´e Joyal and Anne Queniart reviewed 300 Quebec custody and access
cases from the period 1995–1998.54 They found assessments in 12% of the cases,
child testimony in 6%, and child legal representation in 3%. Because their sample
included both settled and adjudicated cases, these figures do not directly respond to
the research question about the prevalence of this evidence in adjudicated cases.55
However, they do suggest that assessments were the most common form of chil-
dren’s evidence in Quebec in the late 1990s.
(a) Methodology
The researcher conducted a quantitative analysis of 181 reported judgments
from 5 months of 2009 (January, February, March, April, and July) in order to
assess the prevalence of children’s evidence in adjudicated custody and access
cases. The first months of 2009 were used because, when this research began, this
was the latest period for which the cases were available in the databases. July was
subsequently included along with the first four months of the year to increase the
breadth of the sample in the event that cases adjudicated in mid-summer have dif-
ferent characteristics than other cases.56 The category “custody and access cases”
includes all those decisions in which (i) a judge makes a decision about what
parenting arrangement would be in the best interests of a minor child or children,
and (ii) no state agency is a party.
51 Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services Branch — Civil and
Family Law Policy Office, above note 14 at 4.
52 McLeod, above note 9 at 1(1).
53 Regarding the rarity of judicial interviews, see Bessner, above note 17 at 32; Ministry
of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services Branch — Civil and Family
Law Policy Office, above note 14 at 13, and Nicholas Bala, Victoria Talwar & Joanna
Harris, “The Voice of Children in Canadian Family Law Cases” (2005) 24 Can. Fam.
L.Q. at 245. Regarding testimony, see Bala, Talwar & Harris, ibid., at 16; Thompson,
above note 8 at 3(iii)(b), and McLeod, above note 9 at section 4(11)(a).
54 Rene´e Joyal & Anne Queniart, “Enhancing the Child’s Point of View in Custody and
Access Cases in Quebec: Preliminary Results of a Study Conducted in Quebec” (2002)
19 Can. J. Fam. L. 173.
55 The authors observed at page 182 that these forms of children’s evidence were more
likely to appear in the more contentious cases which settled later in the process or did
not settle at all. (ibid.)
56 This might be true if there are seasonal variations in the activities of Canada’s family
courts.
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The first step in identifying these cases was to run keyword searches in the
Westlaw Canada and Quicklaw databases.57 Both databases use the words “custody
and access” in the keywords assigned to a case record if the subject matter justifies
it. This search produced 302 cases, but a number of the cases returned by these
queries were not appropriate for the research question. The researcher excluded
from the sample those cases in which the outcome was not based on a judicial
decision about the best interests of the child. For example, an existing custody or
access order under the Divorce Act can only be varied if the court concludes that
there has been a “material change” in the “condition, means, needs or other circum-
stances of the child of the marriage” since the original order.58 Judgments in which
the status quo was preserved because this threshold was not passed were not in-
cluded in the sample because no “best interests” analysis was made.
Motions to strike, stay, or dismiss pleadings and contempt motions arising
from custody and access rulings were also excluded. So were applications under the
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“Hague Conven-
tion”) and judgments which pertained only to procedure, costs, or jurisdictional
questions. Appeals, consent orders, and uncontested trials were excluded, because
they do not generally include either children’s evidence or new evidence of any
kind.
Having excluded these cases, 181 remained. The sample included 33 cases
from the Atlantic provinces, 5 from Quebec, 54 from Ontario, 41 from the Prairie
provinces and the territories, and 48 from British Columbia. For each of these, the
following information was gathered from the judgment:
1. Jurisdiction.
2. Age of Child(ren). In 174 of the 181 cases, the judgment reported the
age or birth month of the child. Five judgments stated only that the child
was born in a certain year; in these the child’s birth date was recorded as
being July 1st of that year (the mid-point.) If a child’s birth date was only
stated to be in a certain month, the birth date was recorded as being the
mid-point of that month.
3. Case Type. It was recorded whether the dispute was about (i) custody,
and/or (ii) time-sharing.59 “Time-sharing” disputes are about what peri-
ods of time a child should spend with various adults. They include both
access disputes (involving the time with a parent who does not have cus-
tody) and disputes among joint custodian adults about how the child’s
time should be divided. Also recorded were whether a particular case in-
volved grandparents of the child(ren) as parties, and whether it was a
“mobility” case. Mobility cases were defined as those cases in which one
57 The researcher had hoped to utilize the CanLii database as well, but Canlii cases do not
have headnotes or keywords. FileMaker Pro was used to create a database of all the
cases which responded to the queries.
58 Gordon v. Goertz, 1996 CarswellSask 199, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, 19 R.F.L. (4th) 177,
1996 CarswellSask 199F (S.C.C.) at para. 9 [CarswellSask].
59 Alberta’s Family Law Act, S.A. 2003, c. F-4.5 (Division 2) uses the word “guardian-
ship” instead of “custody.”
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of the parties intended to move to a location sufficiently distant to com-
plicate time-sharing, or were resident at such a distant location at the time
of trial.
4. Types of Children’s Evidence Present. As noted above, children’s evi-
dence was defined to include the following three categories:
(i) Direct children’s evidence, which came directly from the
child to the judge. This included judicial interviews of children,
affidavits from children, and courtroom testimony of children.
It did not include documents or recordings of the child which
the child did not intend to be heard or seen by the decision-
maker.60
(ii) Child-focused evidence, which came from a professional
with child-related expertise and a mandate to identify the best
interests and/or preferences of the child. This included repre-
sentations from lawyers for children and custody or access as-
sessments by social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists, or
lawyers.
(iii) Derivative children’s evidence, which included evidence
from child protection staff, counsellors, or others with child-
related professional expertise who worked personally with the
child but did not have a mandate specific to the custody or ac-
cess dispute. Individuals who opined about the best interests of
a child without meeting the child were not considered sources
of children’s evidence.61 Nor were those who evaluated the
parenting capacity of one or more adults without meeting the
child involved.62 Finally, children’s evidence was defined to
exclude statements about a child’s interests or preferences
which came from individuals without child-related professional
expertise, such as friends or relatives of the parties.63
Many custody and access litigants return to court multiple times with regard to
the same children. It is not uncommon for a decision to refer to some form of chil-
60 E.g. text messages or emails from children to others which adults printed off and
brought to court (as in S.C. v. J.C., 2009 SKQB 87, [2009] S.J. No. 121 (Sask. Q.B.) at
para. 66, [S.J. No.]).
61 E.g. Wiebe v. Wiebe (2009), 2009 CarswellSask 30 (Sask. Q.B.); Petrie v. Brown
(2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1477 (Ont. C.J.).
62 E.g. S.C. v. J.C., 2009 SKQB 87, [2009] S.J. No. 121 (Sask. Q.B.) at paras 40 and 51
[S.J. No.].
63 Two examples of this type are J.H. v. L.D., 2009 NLTD 54, [2009] N.J. No. 109, ¶13
(N.L. T.D.) [N.J. No.] and M. (R.V.) v. L. (W.F.) (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 315 (Alta.
Q.B.) at paras. 51 and 55 [CarswellAlta]. In these cases, individuals who had super-
vised access visits but who lacked child-related professional expertise testified. As
noted in Thompson, above note 8 at pp. 288–290, statements of this nature are often
admitted as a matter of evidence law under the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay
rule. For the purposes of this article, however, they were not considered “children’s
evidence.”
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dren’s evidence originally presented at an earlier hearing. The researcher distin-
guished between cases in which child-focused evidence was prepared “fresh” for
the most recent hearing and those in which it was from a previous proceeding.
Conversely, in a number of cases there was no children’s evidence available to
assist the judge in making the immediate custody or access decision, but the judg-
ment ordered that children’s evidence be provided or noted that it would be availa-
ble at a future hearing. These cases with “pending” children’s evidence were also
distinguished from those in which the evidence was actually available to assist the
decision being made.
(b) Findings
(i) Prevalence of Children’s Evidence
The following chart reports the prevalence of the various types of children’s
evidence in the sample of custody and access decisions. This chart includes cases in
which children’s evidence from an earlier proceeding was mentioned, but excludes
those in which it was said that the children’s evidence was being prepared or would
be available at a later date.64
Table 1: Prevalence of Different Forms of Children’s Evidence
Direct Child- Child- Derivative Any Form
Children’s Focused Focused Children’s of
Evidence Evidence: Evidence: Evidence Children’s
Lawyer Assessment evidence
Mentioned 5 cases 13 cases 54 cases 47 cases 82 cases
in judgment: (3%) (7%) (30%) (26%) (45%)
Not men- 176 cases 168 cases 127 cases 134 cases 99 cases
tioned in (97%) (93%) (70%) (74%) (55%)
judgment:
Total: 181 cases
The majority of the custody and access judgments in the sample (55%) did not
mention children’s evidence of any kind. Despite the legal primacy of children’s
interests, and despite the broad admissibility and general enthusiasm for this evi-
dence, children’s evidence does not appear to be present in the majority of custody
and access adjudications in the sample.
The number of cases in which there was any form of children’s evidence (82)
is less than the sum of the other four columns in Table 1 (119). This is because a
64 There were 13 such cases in the sample.
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number of cases had multiple forms of children’s evidence. Watkins v. Watkins,
[2009] O.J. No. 1020, a case in which a mother sought to vary a joint custody
order, included four forms of children’s evidence. In this case assessments were
conducted by two social workers, one of whom was retained by the Office of the
Children’s Lawyer. A psychiatrist who had diagnosed the child testified, as did a
representative of the Catholic Children’s Aid Society who had conducted a child
protection investigation. Finally, testimony was heard from the principal of the
children’s school. A total of 22 cases had multiple forms of children’s evidence
present. Other cases involved multiple instances of one type of children’s evidence.
The pie chart below shows that, while most cases had no children’s evidence or one
type present, a significant number included more than one type of children’s
evidence.
Relatively few Canadian custody and access cases seem to involve a “battle of
the experts,” with various professionals taking contradictory positions about what
would be best for the child. There were only three cases in which one expert criti-
qued or repeated an assessment conducted by another.65 The more common expla-
65 Johal v. Johal, 2009 BCSC 139, [2009] B.C.J. No. 195 (B.C. S.C.); McGee v. Vajda,
2009 BCSC 945, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1404 (B.C. S.C.); G.C. v. I.C., 2009 BCPC 149,
[2009] B.C.J. No. 1003 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
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nation for the multiple assessments was that the earlier ones had “gone stale” by the
time of the hearing because facts had changed.66 In at least 8 cases, the children’s
evidence present had been prepared prior to an earlier judicial hearing.67
(c) Types of Evidence
Direct children’s evidence was mentioned in only 5 judgments, 3% of the
sample. An affidavit from a child was admitted in one case,68 and in two others,
both from Quebec, the child testified.69 In T.B.M. v. C.J.M., the 14 year old child
wrote a “short note to the Court” in which he “asked to speak to the Court to clear
up confusion resulting from things said.”70 The judge, however, declined to inter-
view the child or to allow him to testify, and instead arranged for the psychologist
assessor to speak to the child. In E.A. v. D.D.P., the mother attached an undated
note which was purportedly from the child to one of her affidavits. The judgment
reproduced the note, but observed that it was only “allegedly” from the child.71
Although the judicial interview has generated a certain amount of commen-
tary,72 this form of children’s evidence was not found within the sample.
Legal representation of the child was found in 13 cases, 7% of the sample. In
the five Ontario cases, the lawyer was appointed by the Office of the Children’s
66 E.g. K.L.P. v. J.F.P., 2009 BCSC 484, [2009] B.C.J. No. 697 (B.C. S.C.); M.N.M.A. v.
S.D.A., 2009 BCSC 450, [2009] B.C.J. No. 662 (B.C. S.C.). The author’s prior research
(Noel Semple, The Eye Of The Beholder: Professional Opinions About The Best Inter-
ests Of A Child, (LL.M. Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2009)
[unpublished] Online: http://www.noelsemple.ca/?p=47#more-47) suggests that, with
regard to assessments conducted by Ontario’s Office of the Children’s Lawyer, the
period of time elapsed between the completion of the assessment and the hearing of the
case often leads to the assessor’s recommendation being rejected by the judge.
67 L. (A.G.) v. D. (K.B.) (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 188 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at
(2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1764 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at (June 9, 2009), Doc
99-FP-246860FIS (Ont. S.C.J.); Rosenow v. Dooley (2009), 2009 CarswellMan 4;
K.L.P. v. J.F.P., 2009 BCSC 475, [2009] B.C.J. No. 696 (B.C. S.C.); Lien v. Lorenz,
2009 BCSC 359, [2009] B.C.J. No. 510 (B.C. S.C.); M.N.M.A. v. S.D.A., 2009 BCSC
450, [2009] B.C.J. No. 662 (B.C. S.C.); Droit de la famille — 09744, 2009 QCCS
1441, [2009] Q.J. No. 2804 (Q.S.C.); Foster v. Foster (April 22, 2009), Doc. F122/08,
[2009] O.J. No. 1616 (O.S. C.J.); S. (J.) v. S. (G.J.) (2009), 2009 CarswellBC 587
(B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]).
68 Holmes v. Holmes (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 87 (Ont. S.C.J.).
69 Droit de la famille — 09438, 2009 QCCS 835, [2009] Q.J. No. 1587 (Ont. S.C.)
70 T.B.M. v. C.J.M., 2009 BCSC 974, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1456 (B.C. S.C.).
71 E.A. v. D.D.P., 2009 CarswellBC 766, [2009] B.C.J. No. 599 (B.C. S.C.).
72 Above, note 30.
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Lawyer.73 In a Nova Scotia case the lawyer was identified as a guardian ad litem,74
and in two Yukon Territory cases the lawyer was identified as “child advocate.”75
In the other 5 cases, counsel for the child was listed in the same fashion as counsel
for the parties.
Assessment was the most common form of children’s evidence found in the
sample; it appeared in 54 cases (30%). Twenty judgments mentioned assessments
conducted by psychologists and 23 mentioned assessments by social workers. Two
cases from British Columbia involved “views of the child” reports from lawyers
who did not represent the children in the litigation.76 In the remainder of the cases
it was not clear which type of professional conducted the assessment.
Derivative children’s evidence appeared in roughly a quarter of the cases. As
noted above, this category consisted of evidence from professionals who had con-
tact with the child but who were not retained for the specific purpose of resolving
the custody or access dispute.
73 MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2009 CarswellOnt 1839, [2009] O.J. No. 1381 (Ont.
S.C.J.); Darby v. Darby (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 197 (Ont. S.C.J.); L. (A.G.) v. D.
(K.B.) (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 188 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at (2009), 2009
CarswellOnt 1764 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 3273
(Ont. S.C.J.); White v. Lavinskas (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 278 (Ont. S.C.J.); addi-
tional reasons at (2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 1666 (Ont. S.C.J.); Ward v. Swan (2009),
2009 CarswellOnt 4459 (Ont. S.C.J.).
74 Nova Scotia (Minister of Community Services) v. K.H., [2009] N.S.J. No. 92. This
judgment involved a custody dispute between parents as well as a child protection pro-
ceeding. The guardian ad litem was appointed for the protection proceeding but also
participated in the private custody dispute.
75 J.M.H. v. E.C.H., 2009 YKSC 35, [2009] Y.J. No. 63 (Y.T. S.C.); G. (K.R.) v. R. (R.)
(2009), 2009 CarswellYukon 61 (Y.T. S.C.).
76 Lundell v. Beach, 2009 BCSC 170, [2009] B.C.J. No. 270 (B.C. S.C.) and M.E.C. v.
D.E.J.,
Statutes, Regulations and Rules Cited:
Family Relations Act, RSBC 1996, C. 128, s. 9, s. 15, s. 20, s. 24, s. 30, s.
35, s. 57
Rules of Court, Rule 3, Rule 44, Rule 51A, Rule 52, Rule 57, Rule 60
Counsel:
Counsel for the Plaintiffs: M.D. Brooke.
Counsel for the Defendant, Ericka Genna Beach: J.D.R. Landis.
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Table 2: Breakdown of Derivative Children’s Evidence
Number of Cases Percentage of the
Sample in Which it
Appeared
Family Doctor or Other 8 4%
Medical Professional
Child Protection Worker 21 12%
Counsellor or Therapist 10 6%
for Child or Neutral Ac-
cess Supervisor
School Employee 8 4%
(d) Type of Case
The following table indicates the prevalence of children’s evidence in the
cases of various types. The definitions of the case types were discussed earlier.
Note that the total number of cases in the table below exceeds the total number in
the sample, because some cases fit in multiple categories. For example, in four
cases in the sample, grandparents were contesting custody.77
77 Mingo v. Solomon (July 17, 2009), Doc. F141/07, [2009] O.J. No. 3031 (Ont. S.C.J.);
Partridge v. Partridge, 2009 MBQB 196, [2009] M.J. No. 273 (Man. Q.B.); C.B. v.
S.B., 2009 YKSC 12, [2009] Y.J. No. 22 (Yukon S.C.); Ward v. Swan (2009), 2009
CarswellOnt 4459 (Ont. S.C.J.).
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Table 3: Prevalence of Children’s Evidence by Case Type
Custody Only Time Grandparent Mobility
Contested Sharing Cases Cases
Contested
Children’s Ev. 53 cases 21 cases 2 cases 21 cases
Mentioned in (50%) (36%) (29%) (42%)
Judgment
Children’s Ev. Not 52 cases 38 cases 5 cases 29 cases
Mentioned in (50%) (64%) (71%) (58%)
Judgment
Total 105 cases 59 cases 7 cases 50 cases
50 of the custody and access cases in the sample, or 28%, had a mobility ele-
ment as defined above. Given the small sizes of the case type sub-groups, it cannot
be conclusively said that grandparent or mobility cases are more or less likely than
the average case to include children’s evidence.
However, the percentage of time-sharing cases with children’s evidence is no-
ticeably lower than that for the custody cases. It is plausible that custody cases are
perceived by the parties as more important to themselves and to their children, and
therefore more likely to justify the costs and risks of bringing forward children’s
evidence. To determine whether the phenomenon observed in the sample is likely
to occur throughout the population, the author conducted a chi-square statistical
test. A level of statistical significance of .05 was chosen, meaning that the author
would assume that the difference in averages occurred by chance unless the statisti-
cal test indicated a 95% likelihood that this was not the case. On this standard, the
null hypothesis (that there is no difference between the population of “custody con-
tested” cases and the population of “only time sharing contested” cases) cannot be
rejected.78
(e) Geographic Areas
The following chart indicates what percentage of the cases in the various juris-
dictions included any form of children’s evidence.
78 However, the chi-square result came close to establishing statistical significance (X2(1)
= 3.4, p = 0.066).
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Table 4: Prevalence of Children’s Evidence In Geographic Areas
Geographic Atlantic Quebec Ontario Prairie British
Area → Provinces Provinces Columbia
and
Territories
Children’s Ev. 13 cases 4 cases 29 cases 11 cases 25 cases
Mentioned in (39%) (80%) (54%) (27%) (52%)
Judgment
Children’s Ev. 20 cases 1 case 25 cases 30 cases 23 cases
Not Mentioned (61%) (20%) (46%) (73%) (48%)
in Judgment
Total 33 cases 5 cases 54 cases 41 cases 48 cases
Given the size of the sample, caution is necessary in seeking region-specific
conclusions about the prevalence of different types of children’s evidence. How-
ever, two observations can be made about legal representation of children. Among
the 48 British Columbia cases, there were none in which a child was represented by
a lawyer. In 23 of the 25 B.C. cases in which there was children’s evidence, there
was an assessment. By contrast, of the very small Quebec sample of 5 cases, law-
yers represented children in 3 cases and in 2 cases direct children’s evidence was
heard.
A chi-square test was again used to determine whether the differences between
jurisdictions were statistically significant. The research hypothesis was confirmed
at the .05 level of statistical significance.79 Specifically, it can be said that chil-
dren’s evidence is less common than the national average in the prairies and territo-
ries, and more common than the national average in Ontario. The relatively high
prevalence in Ontario could be due to the existence of the Office of the Children’s
Lawyer.
(f) Age of Children
The average number of children in the cases in the sample was 1.6, and the
average age of the children was 8.21 years. The researcher hypothesized that there
would be a positive correlation between the average age of the children in a given
case and the likelihood of children’s evidence being heard. Clearly children who
are pre-verbal are not likely to be helpful sources of evidence. It has been said that
79 X2(4) = 10.97, p = 0.026.
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the preferences of older children are more important in custody and access cases,80
and one would therefore expect to find more evidence being heard from older chil-
dren. The research hypothesis was that the average age of children (or the age of
the only child) in cases with children’s evidence was mentioned is greater than the
average of children in those cases in which it was not mentioned.
The data supports this proposition. Within the 81 cases containing information
about child age in which children’s evidence was mentioned, the average age of the
children was 3191 days (8.76 years). Among the 98 cases with age information and
no children’s evidence mentioned, the average age was 2547 days (6.99 years).
To determine the likelihood that this difference would persist across the entire
population (as opposed to the null hypothesis that it merely represents a coinci-
dence in the sample), a t test for independent means was conducted. A level of
statistical significance of .05 was used, which means that the researcher would as-
sume that the difference in averages occurred purely by chance unless the statistical
test indicated a 95% likelihood that this was not the case. On this standard, the
research hypothesis is a more likely explanation than the null hypothesis.81
The researcher then categorized the cases based on the average age of the chil-
dren in years. The following table suggests increases in the prevalence of children’s
evidence both as one moves from cases with an average age of less than 4 years to
those of 4–10 years, and again as one moves from those cases to cases with chil-
dren older than 10 years.
Table 5: Prevalence of Children’s Evidence by Child Age
Age of Child → Less than 4 years Between 4 and 10 Over 10 years
years
Children’s Ev. 6 cases 43 cases 32 cases
Mentioned in (19%) (44%) (64%)
Judgment
Children’s Ev. Not 25 cases 55 cases 18 cases
Mentioned in (81%) (56%) (36%)
Judgment
Total82 31 cases 98 cases 50 cases
80 E.g. Kaplanis v. Kaplanis (2005), 2005 CarswellOnt 266, 10 R.F.L. (6th) 373, 249
D.L.R. (4th) 620 (Ont. C.A.) at para 13 [D.L.R.].
81 t(177) = 3.0965, p = 0.0011.
82
 In two cases in the sample, there was no information about the children’s age: Escandor v.
Little (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 1201 (Alta. Q.B.); Mansfield v. Rasmussen, [2009] O.J. No.
3942, 2009 ONCJ 443 (Ont. C.J.).
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(g) Limitations
This research focused exclusively on adjudicated and reported custody and ac-
cess cases. The overwhelming majority settle, either without a trial or even without
any form of judicial involvement.83 This research does not directly reveal how and
to what extent parents incorporate children’s evidence in reaching settlement terms.
This research relied on a sample of reported cases as an indicator of what is
actually happening in Canadian courtrooms. Two inherent limitations of this meth-
odology must be identified. First, it is possible that children’s evidence was present
in certain cases but the judge chose not to mention it in the case report. However,
children’s evidence is generally welcomed by judges when available, and consid-
ered an important source of facts and analysis in a custody or access case given that
the sole legal criterion is the best interests of the child. When children’s evidence
was mentioned in a case report, it usually received at least 2-3 paragraphs of dis-
cussion in the judgment. It is therefore unlikely that there were many cases in
which it was present but the judge did not think that it merited so much as a men-
tion in the reasons.
Second, the sample only included decisions from the Quicklaw and Westlaw
databases. Not all adjudicated decisions are reported in online databases, although
running the queries in both databases helped to counteract the effect of possible
geographic or other biases in either of them.84 While the sample is jurisdictionally
broad, it is not entirely demographically representative of the population of Canada.
Among the cases meeting the search criteria, Quebec was strongly under-repre-
sented in Quicklaw, and entirely absent from the Westlaw Canada database.85
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
(a) Why is the Child so Often Silent?
The clearest finding from this study was that the primacy of the child in cus-
tody and access doctrine is not usually reflected in the evidence which is available
to the decision-maker in the average case. While a judge deciding such a case is
likely to hear a great deal about the child’s best interests from the parties and their
83 Precise figures regarding the rate of settlement are not available. However, a recent
Ontario survey found that 3% of all family law cases (including those without child-
related issues) commenced in 5 typical Ontario family courts went to trial. (Alf Mamo,
Peter Jaffe, and Debbie Chiodo, Recapturing and Renewing the Vision of the Family
Court. (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General (Ontario), 2007). Location of file:
http://www.crvawc.ca/documents/Family%20Court%20Study%202007.pdf) Another
source suggests that in Quebec, “85% to 90% of couples who separate or divorce are
able to reach agreements relating to corollary measures, such as custody and access.”
(Joyal & Queniart, above note 54 at 174.)
84 116 of the cases in the sample were present in both Quicklaw and Westlaw and had the
words “custody and access” among their keywords in both databases. For 65 of the
cases, these conditions were met for only one of the databases.
85 For the period in question, only 5 Quebec cases were found, or 2.8% of all the cases in
the sample. Per http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/91-215-x/2009000/t002-eng.htm, Quebec
has approximately 23.2% of Canada’s population.
22   CANADIAN FAMILY LAW QUARTERLY [29 C.F.L.Q.]
chosen witnesses, the majority of reported judgments do not indicate that he or she
had access to any children’s evidence as that term was defined above.
This finding was somewhat surprising because, although there is substantial
ambivalence about direct children’s evidence, most commentators are relatively en-
thusiastic about the potential of child-focused evidence to improve outcomes. As
noted above, it is usually admissible as a matter of evidence law. Why was there no
children’s evidence mentioned in the majority of the judgments?
Resource constraints are one plausible explanation. Child-focused evidence re-
quires that the parties or the state pay a lawyer, social worker, or psychologist to
obtain and present it. The Ontario Bar Association recently reported that 40% of all
civil litigants in Canada are self-represented, and that the rate in family court is
even greater than this average.86 Many if not most of the unrepresented cannot
afford lawyers;87 one Ontario survey of family court litigants without lawyers
found that 83% stated that they were unable to afford the fees.88 Adults who cannot
afford to retain lawyers themselves are not likely to be able to afford any form of
child-focused evidence.
Children’s evidence may also be state-funded, but resources are limited here
too. Chief Justice of Ontario Warren K. Winkler’s comments at the 2008 Opening
of the Courts speech implicitly acknowledged this reality: 
Family law matters which are now understood to be complex, social
problems that require multi-disciplinary and co-ordinated responses must at-
tract the resources they require. Indeed, the pace of new funding must in-
crease, in recognition of the fact that judicial intervention is only part of
what is needed to cope with family break-down and child protection.89
Alberta and British Columbia cut back funding for child legal representation
during the 1990s.90 Even when there is money to pay for child-focused evidence,
there may not be anyone available to provide it. For example, there is evidence that
demand for assessments exceeds supply in many parts of the country. Irwin
Butkowsky, a prominent private custody assessor in Ontario, noted a backlog in a
recent conference. Using an example from his own practice, Mr. Butkowsky stated
that if he is retained to conduct the assessment, he expects to be able to begin the
86 Ontario Bar Association, Getting It Right: The Report of the Ontario Bar Association
Justice Stakeholder Summit. Ontario Bar Association, (Toronto, 2008) Online:
http://www.oba.org/en/pdf/Justice_Summit_sml.pdf at 8.
87 D. A. Rollie Thompson & Lynn Reierson, “A Practicing Lawyer’s Field Guide to the
Unrepresented” (2002) 19 Can. Fam. L.Q. 529 at 529-530.
88 Anne-Marie Langan, “Threatening the Balance of the Scales of Justice: Unrepresented
Litigants in the Family Courts of Ontario” (2005) 30 Queen’s L.J. at 832.
89 Warren K. Winkler, “Opening of the Courts Speech” September 9, 2008 2008)
[unpublished].
90 Hensley, above note 22 at 4-5; Bala, “Child Representation in Alberta” above note 30;
Ministry of Attorney General (British Columbia) Justice Services Branch — Civil and
Family Law Policy Office, above note 14 at 12.
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process only 10–12 weeks later.91 In the Manitoba case of Poste v. Mitchell-
Poste,92 the judge ordered an assessment and went on to state that he was “mindful
of the delay which will ensue given the backlog of outstanding assessments at Fam-
ily Conciliation Services.” Such a backlog is a disincentive for the parties or court
to seek child-focused evidence, because it means that doing so will delay the reso-
lution of the case.
(b) Protectionism Ascendant?
At the outset, this article reviewed liberationism and protectionism, the two
dominant schools of thought regarding the place of children in the legal system.93
The prevalent forms of children’s evidence in the cases are more consistent with
the “child protectionist” model than with the “child liberationist” model. Child-
focused evidence in the form of assessments was by far the most common form of
children’s evidence. Assessments by definition seek to identify the best interests of
the child, or at least present information which is relevant to those interests. While
the assessment process includes ascertaining the child’s views and preferences if he
or she can express them, these views and preferences are not treated as dispositive
of the question of the child’s interests.94 Insofar as the child controls neither the
process nor the outcome of an assessment, this form of evidence is most compatible
with the child protectionist school.
Representation of the child by a lawyer came a distant second among the most
prevalent forms of children’s evidence. As noted above, there is a live debate about
whether and to what extent lawyers should take instructions from their minor cli-
ents in these disputes, as opposed to advocating their best interests as the lawyer
understands them. The approach taken by such a lawyer in Canada today depends
on the lawyer, the child, and the jurisdiction. While a hypothetical child liberation-
ist would approve of a lawyer who takes the child’s instructions, a child protection-
ist would be more likely to endorse “best interests advocacy.”
Least common of all was direct children’s evidence, which was mentioned in
only 3% of the cases in the sample. Direct children’s evidence is most compatible
with the child liberationist school of thought identified above. Those who believe
that children should be treated as active rights-holders in custody and access dis-
putes, are also likely to believe that the child should speak directly to the decision-
maker.95 The paucity of this type of evidence suggests that the judges and others
who make decisions about children’s evidence have not embraced the child libera-
91 Irwin S. Butkowsky, “Remarks” in Family Law: The Voice of the Child (Remarks de-
livered at Law Society of Upper Canada Continuing Legal Education seminar, March
5th 2009.)).
92 Poste v. Mitchell-Poste, 2009 CarswellMan 368, ¶51.
93 Above, at page 5.
94 Fidler & Birnbaum, above note 44, at section 2(e). An exception is “views of the child”
assessments conducted in British Columbia. These generally report on the child’s pref-
erences without expressing an opinion for or against them.
95 For example, in a recent article, Nick Bala and Rachel Birnbaum observe “growing
acceptance of the legal principle that children have the right to be heard when post-
separation parenting arrangements are being made.” Birnbaum & Bala, “The Child’s
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tionist doctrine that children should be active participants in important decisions
that affect them, such as custody and access litigation.
There is now a growing breadth and depth of scholarship on children’s evi-
dence in Canadian custody and access litigation. This article has sought to contrib-
ute to the literature by deploying a quantitative methodology to answer research
questions about the prevalence of various types of children’s evidence in reported
decisions. The article is also part of an ongoing personal research agenda. Through
the use of qualitative and quantitative empirical methods, can we better understand
how custody and access cases are actually resolved in and out of court? What are
the costs and benefits of the status quo for the children involved? Are improve-
ments possible despite resource constraints? While quantitative analysis of reported
cases can not reveal what’s happening “on the ground” with perfect clarity, it does
offer a useful perspective. From this vantage point, it appears that despite the legal
pre-eminence of children’s interests in custody and access law, the surprising real-
ity is that the children themselves are usually silent. 
Perspective On Representation: Young Adults Report On Their Experiences With
Child Lawyers” above note 6 at 16.
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